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RES IPSA LOQUITUR AND GROSS NEGLIGENCE
I N A DICTUM in the recent case of Garland v. Greenspan,' the Supreme
Court of Nevada echoed an apparently unanimous rule2 that the doc-
trine of res ipsa loquitur will not raise an inference3 of gross negligence.
The facts as found by the trial court sitting without a jury showed
that one of the plaintiffs4 was injured when the defendants' automobile
swerved to the left of the highway and then to the right, overturning on
striking the right shoulder. The defendant driver had lost control of
her car for "some unexplained reason" after passing another automobile
at a speed in excess of sixty-five miles an hour and in returning to the
right-hand line while negotiating a turn to the right.
Under the Nevada statute,6 a guest passenger can recover in tort
from the host driver only where injury was caused by the driver's in-
toxication, wilful misconduct, or gross negligence. The Supreme Court
of Nevada, affirming the judgment of the trial court, held that gross neg-
ligence or wilful misconduct had not been established as a matter of law,
'_Nev.-, 323 P.±d 27 (1958).
'See Harlan v. Taylor, z39 Cal. App. 30, 33 P.zd 422 (934); Lincoln v. Quick,
133 Cal. App. 433, 24 P.2d 245 (1933); O'Reilly v. Sattler, x4i Fla. 770, 193 So.
817 (1940); Minkovitz v. Fine, 67 Ga. App. 176, i9 S.E.zd 561 (1942); Rupe v.
Smith, x~i Kan. 6o6, 323 P.zd 293 (x957); Winslow v. Tibbetts, 231 Me. 318, x6z
Ad. 785 (1932); Nyberg v. Kirby, 65 Nev. 42, x88 P.zd ioo6, rehearing denied, x6s
Nev. 78, 193 P.zd 85o (1948); Wood v. Shrewsbury, 117 W. Va. 569, 186 S.E. 294
(1936). Cf. Russell v. Turner, 56 F. Supp. 455 (N.D. Iowa 1944) (recklessness);
Johnson v. Trust Co. of Chicago, 343 Ill. App. 647, 99 N.E.2d 715 (i95x) (wilful and
wanton negligence); Cizek v. Union Stock Yard & Transit Co., 298 111. App. 545, x9
N.E.zd 1o (1939) (wilful and wanton negligence).
'There is a split of authority upon the question whether res ipsa loquitur should
raise an inference or a rebuttable presumption of negligence. Compare Prosser, Re:
Ipsa Loquitur: A4 Reply to Professor Carpenter, to So. CAL. L. REV. 459 (1937),
with Carpenter, Res Ipsa Loquitur: .4 Rejoinder to Professor Prosser, 10 So. CAL. L.
REV. 467 (1937), and SHAIN, REs IPSA LOQUITUR, PRESUMPTIONS AND BURDEN OF
PROOF 23-182 (1945).
'The action was brought by one married couple against another. Only the wives
were in the automobile at the time of the accident.
'The evidence was in dispute whether the defendant driver was speeding at almost
eighty miles an hour, was inexperienced in the operation of an automobile, and had
been requested either to slow down or to allow her guest to continue the trip in another
car.
aNEv. REV. STAT. § 41.80 (1957).
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and observed that "[plaintiffs] have cited us no authority to the effect
that [the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur] can supply an inference of gross
negligence or wilfulness."
'7
It is not dear that the splintering of negligence into subdivisions of
slight, ordinary, and gross does more than compound the difficulty of
giving adequate definition to an already amorphous legal concept., Yet,
although interpretations of the meaning of gross negligence have pro-
duced notoriously chaotic results,9 a number of states ° recognize de-
grees of negligence at common law. At least six other jurisdictions1'
incorporate gross negligence in automobile guest statutes as a basis of
tort liability. But whether or not the concept of gross negligence
has anything to recommend it, no dear reason appears why it must
be given the effect of arbitrarily precluding operation of the doc-
trine of res ipsa loquitur. This latter doctrine, after all, does no
more than give appropriate weight in certain situations 2 to circumstantial
-Nev.--, 323 P.zd 27, 28 (1958).
"From the time of Justinian until the present day the doctrine of degrees of neg-
ligence has engendered confusion-a confusion which is being aggravated rather than
abated by the recent statutory enactments on comparative negligence and 'automobile
guest' liability.' Elliott, Degrees of Negligence, 6 So. CAL. L. REV. 9 t , 141 (1933).
For a discussion of cases rejecting the concept of degrees of negligence, see id., at 124-
27. See also 2 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS 952 (1956); PROSSER, ToRTs 148-49 (zd
ed. 9ss).
SSee, e.g., Cope v. Davison, 30 Cal.zd 193, 18o P.2d 873 (1947); Donelan v.
Wright, 148 Kan. 287, 81 P.zd 50 (1938); Picarello v. Rodakis, 299 Mass. 33, Ix
N.E.zd 470 (x937); Elliott, supra note 8, at 12o.
10 See Merchants' Bank of Vandervoort v. Affholter, i4o Ark. 480, 215 S.W. 648
(1919) ; Kenny Transfer Co. v. Mayer Bros. Co., 170 Ill. App. 607 (1912) ; Louisville
& Nashville R.R. v. Brown, 186 Ky. 435, 217 S.W. 686 (1919); Dinardi v. Herook,
328 Mass. 572, 1o5 N.E.2d 197 (1952); Santoro v. Central New York Power Corp.,
189 Misc. 567, 72 N.Y.S.zd 12 (1947); Engle v. Reider, 366 Pa. 4i1, 77 A.2d 621
(5951) ; Helms v. Universal Atlas Cement Co., 202 F.2d 421 (Sth Cir. 1953) (apply-
ing Texas law). See also Elliott, supra note 8, at 121 nn. 131-38.
2" KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 8-x22b (1949); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 256.29 (1948);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 39-740 (1943); NEv. REV. STAT. § 41.i8o (1957); N.D. REV.
CODE § 39-1503 (x943); ORE. REV. STAT. § 30.110 (1953).
"'Res ipsa loquitur is said to apply when the accident is of a kind which would
not ordinarily occur in the absence of negligence on the part of someone, the apparent
cause of the accident is such that any negligence connected with it would be attributable
to the defendant, and the possibility of contributing conduct which would make the
plaintiff responsible is eliminated. PROSSER, TORTs x99 (2d ed. x955). "Some
authority suggests the additional requirement that evident as to the explanation of the
accident must be more readily accessible to the defendant than to the plaintiff. The
better view would seem to be that this is not essential, so long as the circumstances
give rise to a reasonable inference of negligence2 Ibid. See also 2 HARPER & JAMES,
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evidence1 through creation of a rebuttable presumption or inference
of negligence. What mystic quality has gross negligence that it can-
not be inferred from circumstantial evidence?
In fact, there may exist in certain other jurisdictions at least a con-
ceptual justification for a rule similar to that asserted in the dictum of the
instant case. In some jurisdictions,' 4 gross negligence is assimilated to
heedless, wanton, or reckless misconduct. In others,'6 gross negligence
is regarded as simply a greater degree of negligence. Thus, the dis-
tinction between ordinary and gross negligence may be either one of
kind or of quantity. In a jurisdiction adhering to the distinction in
kind, it might be argued that res ipsa loquitur may raise a presumption
or inference of a lack of due care, but not of the mental element ap-
proaching intent, unnecessary to a finding of negligence but required in
a finding of wantoness or recklessness. In a jurisdiction which adopts the
distinction in quantity, however, it appears anomalous that res ipsa
loquitur should be effective to raise a presumption or inference of a
want of due care but not a higher degree of that same want.
It is not suggested that a different result should have obtained in
the instant case, but in as much as Nevada adheres to the distinction in
quantity, 6 it appears that the curt rejection of res ipsa loquitur merely
ToRms §§ 19.5-x9.9 (.956). For an able analysis of the operation of the doctrine, see
Jaffe, Res Ipsa Loquitur Vindicated, i BUFFALO L. REv. x (1951).
"' Some courts, however, take pains to indicate that res ipsa loquitur is not a rule of
"circumstantial evidence, the inference to be drawn by the jury .. . resting not upon
evidence, ...but upon a postulate from common experience that accidents of the kind
involved do not ordinarily occur in the absence of negligence." Maki v. Murray
Hospital, 91 Mont. 251, z63, 7 P.2d z8, 231 (1932). Cf. Belding v. St. Louis Public
Service Co., 725 S.W.2d 506 (Mo. x948); Eickhoff v. Beard-Laney, Inc., x99 S.C.
500, 20 S.E.±d 153 (194±); Johnson v. Ely, 3o Tenn. App. 294, 205 S.W.2d 759(7947).
", See Srajer v. Schwartzman, 164 Kan. 241, 188 P.zd 971 (1948) , Froh v. Hein,
76 N.D. 7o1 39 N.W.±d 11 (1949); State ex. rel. Zent v. Yanny, 244 Wis. 342, 12
N.W.zd 45 (2943).
"S See Kastel v. Stieber, 83 Cal. App. Dec. 249, 8 P.2d 474 (1932); Whitfield v.
Wheeler, 76 Ga. App. 857, 47 S.E.2d 658 (1948) ; Hamblen v. Steckley, 148 Neb. 283,
27 N.W.2d 178 (1947); Shaw v. Moore, 104 Vt. 529, 162 Adt. 373 (1932) ; Alspaugh
v. Diggs, 195 Va. 1, 77 S.E.2d 362 (1953).
" "The lement of culpability which characterizes all negligence is, in gross negli-
gence, magnified to a higher degree as compared with that present in ordinary neg-
ligence. Gross negligence is manifestly a smaller amount of watchfulness and circum-
spection than the circumstances require of a prudent man. But it falls short of being
such reckless disregard of probable consequences as is equivalent to a willful and in-
tentional wrong. Ordinary and gross negligence differ in degree of inattention, while
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because of a dearth of authority for such a usage contravenes the logic
of that doctrine.
both differ in kind from willful and intentional conduct which is or ought to be
known to have a tendency to injure." Hart v. Kline, 61 Nev. 96, ioo-ioi, xx6 P.zd
672, 674 (194x), adopting the rule of Altman v. Aronson, 231 Mass. 588, 595, 121
N.E. 505, 5o6 (1919).
